

ACTION
OCA 86-2370

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	ACTION	INFO
1. D/OCA		X
2. DD/Legislation		X
3. DD/Senate Affairs		X
4. Ch/Senate Affairs		
5. DD/House Affairs		X
6. Ch/House Affairs	X	
7. Admin Officer		
8. Executive Officer		X
9. FOIA Officer		
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SUSPENSE 21 July 86
Date

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Joyce.

Mr. Daniel would like
CIA's assessment of this
article.

Thanks

Tom Latorre

THURSDAY MORNING, 26 JUNE 1986

WASHINGTON TIMES 26 June 1986 Pg. 1

Communists detail S. Africa takeover

By Peter Younghusband
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

CAPE TOWN, South Africa — A secret document circulated by the Politburo of the South African Communist Party confirms its partnership with the outlawed African National Congress and gives a blueprint for a "revolutionary seizure of power" that precludes any peaceful transition to black majority rule.

The 14-page "directive/discussion" document came into the hands of South African intelligence officers and, together with other intelligence gathered in the past two months, prompted the government's decision to declare a state of emergency on June 12.

The document makes it clear that any negotiations the ANC may have with "the liberal bourgeoisie" in South Africa should be regarded as purely diversionary, a ploy to "divide the enemy" rather than a serious attempt to seek a peaceful solution.

The Pretoria government has refused to enter into negotiations with the ANC until it renounces violence and separates itself from the SACP with which, the document confirms, it is so intertwined that its own executive is dominated by Moscow.

The document originated from an extended Politburo meeting with members of the central committee in March 1986. It concedes that there are South Africans genuinely committed to dismantling apartheid, but warns that the ANC should not allow these "forces for change" to dilute their revolutionary ardor.

Paragraph 5.3 of the document says: "Our broad strategy for achieving peoples power is to mobilise the masses for a seizure of power through a combination of political action and armed struggle in which partial and general uprisings will play a vital role in the developing states of people's war."

Paragraph 13.2.3 says: "The main thrust of our present strategy remains a revolutionary seizure of power."

The document expresses ambivalence about recent meetings between ANC executives in Lusaka (capital of Zambia) and liberal South African businessmen, such as Gavin Reilly, chairman of Anglo American Corp. and liberal politicians, such as Dr. Frederick van Zyl Slabbert, former leader of the parliamentary opposition Progressive Federal Party.

"Premature speculation about possible compromises in order to tempt broader forces such as the liberal bourgeoisie on to our side, may

serve to blunt the edge of the people's revolutionary militancy," it says.

"... There are emerging in South Africa what Lenin called [in relation to the February 1917 Russian Revolution] 'dissimilar currents, heterogeneous class interests, contrary political and social stirrings,' as objective factors in deepening the enemy crisis, fragmenting its previously monolithic character and therefore objectively strengthening the prospects of a radical breakthrough.

"On the face of it there appears to be a proliferation of new groupings which consider themselves to be part of the forces for change, but which cannot necessarily be embraced as part of what we regard as the revolutionary forces."

Paragraph 10 says: "Let us be clear. The liberal bourgeoisie seek transformations of the South African society which go beyond the reform limits of the present regime but which aim to pre-empt the objectives of the revolutionary forces."

"They seek transformation through negotiation and not the kind of conflict which could culminate in a revolutionary seizure of power."

"To implement this tactic they, together with their external allies, can be expected to attempt to push the revolutionary forces into negotiation before they are strong enough to impose their basic objectives. The intention is to defuse the people's struggles and to force a compromise based on existing power relationships."

The document concedes that for the time being there might be strategy value in holding talks with the "liberal bourgeoisie." It says: "A serious revolutionary movement always tries to divide the enemy and to broaden the base of opposition to the main enemy."

It warns against the growth of right-wing movements in South Africa and "the possibility of an undisguised military dictatorship," adding, "we must not under-estimate the counter revolutionary offensive against freedom movements orchestrated by the Reagan administration."

The document reveals that the SACP regards the ANC as little more than a front and intends at some future stage to emerge from behind it and seize direct control of revolutionary action.

It gently downgrades the Freedom Charter, the manifesto of the ANC, which advocates a mild socialism for South Africa in which major industries may be nationalized but private property ownership will be recognized to a large extent. "It is a programme for a socialist South Africa but, depending upon the social forces which come to power, it can become the starting point for creating conditions which would lead to a socialist transformation."

And it says: "The trade union movement does not and cannot carry out the functions of the political vanguard of the working class. This is the role of the party of the working class, which we are."

Paragraph 14.1 says, somewhat plaintively: "We continue to face the old problem of party work always being pushed into second place because of the necessary involvement of virtually all our talented personnel in other structures of the liberation alliance. This continues to limit our capacity for the independent spread of working class perspectives in the struggle and hinders the strengthening of the party organisationally. If no effective steps are taken to deal with this weakness, the party will not be able to carry out its historic mission."

Significantly, paragraph 14.2 says: "It is also necessary to reflect on the profile of the party in the liberation alliance whose public head is correctly the ANC. The question which needs to be addressed is: To what extent has it become accepted as a permanent feature of the alli-

ance that the party is not a participant as a party in the activities and relations of the alliance with other forces?"

"... It has become important to open up this problem for reflection and discussion especially in relation to the status and role of the party in our future serious negotiating processes."

Paragraph 14.3 says: "Making the formal profile of the party more visible will not, on its own, give it the capacity to perform its historic mission. In the end it is the party's strength on the ground and more especially, its organised presence among the black working class, which counts."

Paragraph 15.2 of the document makes clear again the SACP's goal of overturning South Africa from a capitalist society into a communist society: "Liberation implies a massive redistribution of wealth and cannot have much meaning without the undermining of the economic hold over the means of production which is exercised by the existing ruling class and without (at the political level) creating a state form in which the working people are dominant."

"This implies more than an alteration in voting arrangements. Meaningful exercise of people's power during the interim phase is inconceivable in a situation in which the army, the police, the state bureaucracy, the communication media etc. remain substantially in the control of the existing structures."

"It is only a provisional people's government which can take measures which will ensure the possibilities of a real exercise of democracy."

The document also registers smug satisfaction over the apparent increase in support for the ANC front world wide.

It says: "Our liberation front is becoming increasingly accepted as more than an agitational opposition. It is regarded by a large slice of the world and, more importantly, by the majority of our people, as the immediate alternative power to racism and exploitation."

WASHINGTON POST 26 June 1986 Pg. 3

Haig Eyes Presidency 'I'm a Dark, Dark Horse'

Associated Press

CHATTANOOGA, Tenn.—Former secretary of state Alexander M. Haig Jr. says he plans to seek the Republican presidential nomination in 1988.

Haig, secretary of state during part of President Reagan's first term, said Tuesday he will officially announce his bid after this year's elections.

"I just think timing is very, very important because I'm a dark, dark horse," Haig said in an interview with

the Chattanooga News-Free Press. "I believe it [the race] is wide open."

Among those expected to seek the GOP nomination are Vice President Bush, Senate Majority Leader Robert J. Dole, former senate majority leader Howard H. Baker Jr. of Tennessee, Rep. Jack Kemp of New York and former Delaware governor Pierre S. du Pont IV. Haig had explored the possibility of seeking the nomination in 1980 but dropped out long before serious campaigning had begun.

He said he doesn't think Bush can win the race if nominated, calling the vice president's support "a mile wide and an inch thick." Of all the possible GOP candidates, Baker "comes closer to fitting the handle of statesman" than any other, said Haig, who was in Chattanooga to address a local civic group.